An update on Hash-based Signatures

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Trapdoor- / Identification Scheme-based (PQ-)Signatures

Lattice, MQ, Coding



- Signature and/or key sizes

$$y_1 = x_1^2 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_4 + x_3$$
$$y_2 = x_3^2 + x_2x_3 + x_2x_4 + x_1 + 1$$
$$y_3 = \dots$$

- Runtimes



- Secure parameters

Hash-based Signature Schemes

[Mer89]

- Post quantum
- Only secure hash function
- Security well understood
- Fast



FIG 1
AN AUTHENTICATION TREE WITH N = 8.

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RSA – DSA – EC-DSA…



Basic Construction



Lamport-Diffie OTS [Lam79]

Message M = b1,…,bm, OWF H



Merkle's Hash-based Signatures



Winternitz-OTS

Function chains

Function family: $H_n := \{h_k : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\}$

$h_k \xleftarrow{\$} H_n$

Parameter w

Chain: $c^i(x) = h_k(c^{i-1}(x)) = \underbrace{h_k \circ h_k \circ \ldots \circ h_k(x)}_{i-times}$



WOTS

Winternitz parameter $\boldsymbol{w}$, security parameter $\boldsymbol{n}$, message length $\boldsymbol{m}$, function family H_n

Key Generation: Compute l, sample h_k



WOTS Signature generation



WOTS Signature Verification

Verifier knows: M, w



WOTS Function Chains

For $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ define $c^0(x) = x$ and

- WOTS: $c^i(x) = h_k(c^{i-1}(x))$
- WOTS$: $c^i(x) = h_{c^{i-1}(x)}(r)$
- WOTS+: $c^i(x) = h_k(c^{i-1}(x) \oplus r_i)$

WOTS Security

Theorem (informally):

W-OTS *is strongly unforgeable under chosen message attacks if* H_n *is a collision resistant family of undetectable one-way functions*.

W-OTS$ *is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks if* H_n *is a pseudorandom function family.*

W-OTS+ *is strongly unforgeable under chosen message attacks if* H_n *is a 2nd-preimage resistant family of undetectable one-way functions*.

Standardizing hash-based signatures.
The case of XMSS

XMSS

Tree: Uses bitmasks

Leafs: Use binary tree with bitmasks

OTS: WOTS$^+$

Mesage digest: Randomized hashing

Collision-resilient

-> signature size halved



Multi-Tree XMSS

Uses multiple layers of trees

-> Key generation
(= Building first tree on each layer)
$\Theta(2^h) \rightarrow \Theta(d*2^{h/d})$

-> Allows to reduce worst-case signing times
$\Theta(h/2) \rightarrow \Theta(h/2d)$



Multi-target attacks

What is the bit security of XMSS using a n = 256 bit hash function?

256 bit?

No!

Multi-target attacks

It suffices to invert h_k on one out of

$$\sim N \cdot w \cdot l$$

different values. (For N= #WOTS key pairs, m = message length, w = Winternitz parameter, l = |WOTS message encoding|)

Attack complexity: $2^{n - \log(Nwl)}$

For $\mathrm{n} = \mathrm{m} = 256, N = 2^{20}, w = 16, l \sim 64$

approx. 226 bit security

Similar problem applies for second-preimage resistance.

Multi-target attacks

Attack complexity: $2^{n - \log(Nwl)}$

Reason:

- Many targets for same function
- Each hash query can be used for all targets
- Dependent problems

Solution?

Use different elements from function family for each hash (and different bitmasks).

- Makes problems independent
- Each hash query can only be used for one target!

XMSS-Draft since -01

Each hash function call (excl. message hash) takes now a key and a bitmask.

Issue: Order of $N \cdot w \cdot l$ keys and bitmasks that have to be published.

Put them into PK? Impractical

Solution: PRG + Seed in PK

XMSS-Draft since -01

Solution: PRG + Seed in PK

Security:

- Not really standard model.
- Natural but new assumption („Generating the public values using a PRG, the scheme does not get less secure if seed is published.“),
- Or ROM

SPHINCS: practical stateless hash-based signatures

joint work with Daniel J. Bernstein, Daira Hopwood, Tanja Lange, Ruben Niederhagen, Louiza Papachristodoulou, Michael Schneider, Peter Schwabe, Zooko Wilcox O'Hearn

ELIMINATE THE STATE

Protest?

Few-Time Signature Schemes

HORS [RR02]

Message M, OWF H, CRHF H’ [*] = n bit

Parameters t=2^a,k, with m = ka (typical a=16, k=32)



HORS mapping function

Message M, OWF H, CRHF H’



= n bit

Parameters $t=2^a$,k, with m = ka (typical a=16, k=32)



HORS

Message M, OWF H, CRHF H’ [*] = n bit

Parameters $t=2^a$,k, with m = ka (typical a=16, k=32)



HORS Security

- M mapped to k element index set $M^i \in \{1, \ldots, t\}^k$
- Each signature publishes k out of t secrets
- Either break one-wayness or…

- r-Subset-Resilience: After seeing index sets M_j^i for r messages $msg_j, 1 \leq j \leq r$, hard to find $msg_{r+1} \neq msg_j$ such that $M_{r+1}^i \in \bigcup_{1 \leq j \leq r} M_j^i$.

- Best generic attack: $\text{Succ}_{\text{r-SSR}}(A, q) = q \left(\frac{rk}{t}\right)^k$

→ Security shrinks with each signature!

HORST

Using HORS with MSS requires adding PK (tn) to MSS signature.

HORST: Merkle Tree on top of HORS-PK

- New PK = Root
- Publish Authentication Paths for HORS signature values
- PK can be computed from Sig
- With optimizations: $tn \longrightarrow (k(\log t - x + 1) + 2^x)n$
  - E.g. SPHINCS-256: 2 MB → 16 KB
- Use randomized message hash

SPHINCS

- Stateless Scheme
- $XMSS^{MT}$ + HORST
  + (pseudo-)random index
- Collision-resilient
- Deterministic signing
- SPHINCS-256:
  - 128-bit post-quantum secure
  - Hundrest of signatures / sec
  - 41 kb signature
  - 1 kb keys



Thank you!
Questions?



For references & further literature see
https://huelsing.wordpress.com/hash-based-signature-schemes/literature/

(Hash) function families

- $H_n \coloneqq \left\{h_k\colon \{0,1\}^{m(n)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\right\}$
- $m(n) \geq n$
- „efficient“



One-wayness

$H_n \coloneqq \left\{ h_k \colon \{0,1\}^{m(n)} \to \{0,1\}^n \right\}$

$h_k \xleftarrow{\$} H_n$
$x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{m(n)}$
$y_c \leftarrow h_k(x)$

Success if $h_k(x^*) = y_c$

Collision resistance

$H_n \coloneqq \left\{h_k\colon \{0,1\}^{m(n)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\right\}$

$h_k \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} H_n$

Success if
$h_k(x_1^*) = h_k(x_2^*)$

Second-preimage resistance

$H_n \coloneqq \{h_k\colon \{0,1\}^{m(n)} \to \{0,1\}^n\}$

$h_k \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} H_n$
$x_c \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{m(n)}$

Success if
$h_k(x_c) = h_k(x^*)$

x_c, k

$\mathcal{A}$

x^*

Undetectability

$H_n := \{h_k : \{0,1\}^{m(n)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\}$

$h_k \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} H_n$

$b \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}$

If $b = 1$

$\quad x \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{m(n)}$

$\quad y_c \leftarrow h_k(x)$

else

$\quad y_c \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n$

y_c, k

$\mathcal{A}$ 

b^*

Pseudorandomness

$$H_n := \{h_k : \{0,1\}^{m(n)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\}$$