Post-Quantum Cryptography & Privacy

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PQCRYPTO
ICT-645622

Privacy?


... the Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form.
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 1977

Too abstract?







How to achieve privacy?

Tor

DuckDuckGo

Under the hood…

Asymmetric Crypto

- ECC
- RSA
- DSA

Symmetric Crypto

- AES
- SHA2
- SHA1
- …

Combination of both needed!

Public-key cryptography

Main (public-key) primitives

- Digital signature
  - Proof of authorship
  - Provides:
    - Authentication
    - Non-repudiation

- Public-key encryption / key exchange
  - Establishment of commonly known secret key
  - Provides secrecy

Applications

- Code signing (Signatures)
  - Software updates
  - Software distribution
  - Mobile code

- Communication security (Signatures, PKE / KEX)
  - TLS, SSH, IPSec, ...
  - eCommerce, online banking, eGovernment, ...
  - Private online communication

The key exchange problem

Internet: ~ **3,675,824,813** users

➔6,755,844,026,095,330,078 keys
≈6,8* $\mathbf{10^{18}}$ keys



[From: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm , June 30, 2016]

(Secret-)key server



Public key cryptography



We need symmetric and asymmetric crypto to achieve privacy!

How to build PKC



Quantum Computing

Quantum Computing

"Quantum computing studies theoretical computation systems (quantum computers) that make direct use of quantum-mechanical phenomena, such as superposition and entanglement, to perform operations on data."

-- Wikipedia

Qubits

- Qubit state: $\alpha_0 \, |0\rangle + \alpha_1 \, |1\rangle$ with $\alpha_i \in \mathbb{C}$ such that $|\alpha_0|^2 + |\alpha_1|^2 = 1$
- Ket: $|0\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, |1\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$
- Qubit can be in state $\frac{|0\rangle + |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$

- Computing with 0 and 1 at the same time!

Quantum computers are not almighty

- To learn outcome one has to measure.
  - Collapses state
  - 1 qubit leads 1 classical bit of information
  - Randomized process
- Only invertible computation.
- Impossible to clone (copy) quantum state.

The Quantum Threat

Shor‘s algorithm (1994)

- Quantum computers can do FFT very efficiently
- Can be used to find period of a function
- This can be exploited to factor efficiently (RSA)
- Shor also shows how to solve discrete log efficiently (DSA, DH, ECDSA, ECDH)



Grover‘s algorithm (1996)

- Quantum computers can search N entry DB in $\Theta(\sqrt{N})$
- Application to symmetric crypto
- Nice: Grover is provably optimal (For random function)
- Double security parameter.



To sum up

- All asymmetric crypto is broken by QC
  - No more digital signatures
  - No more public key encryption
  - No more key exchange

- Symmetric crypto survives
  (with doubled key size / output length)
  - NOT ENOUGH!

Why care today?

Quantum Computing

"Quantum computing studies theoretical computation systems (quantum computers) that make direct use of quantum-mechanical phenomena, such as superposition and entanglement, to perform operations on data."

-- Wikipedia

Bad news

I will not tell you when a quantum computer will be built!

nature International weekly journal of science

NATURE | NEWS

Europe plans giant billion-euro quantum technologies project

Third European Union flagship will be similar in size and ambition to graphene and human brain initiatives.

Elizabeth Gibney

It‘s a question of risk assessment

How soon do we need to worry?

Depends on:

- How long do you need your keys to be secure? (x years)
- How much time will it take to re-tool the existing infrastructure with large-scale quantum-safe solution? (y years)
- How long will it take for a large-scale quantum computer to be built (or for any other relevant advance? (z years)

Theorem 1: If $x + y > z$, then worry.



Who would store all encrypted data traffic? That must be expensive!

Defending Our Nation. Securing The Citizens.

Time to deployment



- Theoretical design

- Cryptanalysis
- PoC Impl.
- Practical Security Analysis (SCA)

- Competition (Broader evaluation)

- Commerical Impl.
- Integration & Certification
- Role-out

Example: SHA1 →SHA2

- 2005: First weakness
  - SHA2 already available! (Standardized)
- 2008: SHA2 availability in Windows (XP, Service pack 3)

- 2016: 2.6 % of TLS servers use certificates signed using XXX-SHA1 (https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/)
- 2017: First full collision for SHA1 (https://shattered.io/)

Quantum Cryptography

Why not beat ‘em with their own weapons?

- QKD: Quantum Key distribution.
  - Based on some nice quantum properties: entanglement & collapsing measurments
  - Information theoretic security (at least in theory) -> Great!
  - For sale today!
- So why don‘t we use this?
- Only short distance, point-to-point connections!
  - Internet? No way!
- Longer distances require „trusted-repeaters“ ☺
  - We all know where this leads...

PQCRYPTO to the rescue

Quantum-secure problems

No provably quantum resistant problems



Credits: Buchmann, Bindel 2015

Conjectured quantum-secure problems

- Solving multivariate quadratic equations (MQ-problem)
  -> Multivariate Crypto
- Bounded-distance decoding (BDD)
  -> Code-based crypto
- Short(est) and close(st) vector problem (SVP, CVP)
  -> Lattice-based crypto
- Breaking security of symmetric primitives (SHAx-, AES-, Keccak-,... problem)
  -> Hash-based signatures / symmetric crypto

Multivariate Crypto

$$4x + x^2 + y^2z \equiv 1 \mod 13$$

$$7y^2 + 2xz^2 \equiv 12 \mod 13$$

$$x + y^2 + 12xz^2 \equiv 4 \mod 13$$

Solution: $x = 15,\ y = 29,\ z = 45$

Credits: Buchmann, Bindel 2015

MQ-Problem

Let $\boldsymbol{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ and $\mathbf{MQ}(n, m, \mathbb{F}_q)$ denote the family of vectorial functions $\boldsymbol{F}: \mathbb{F}_q^n \longrightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^m$ of degree 2 over $\mathbb{F}_q$:

$\mathbf{MQ}(n, m, \mathbb{F}_q)$

$$= \left\{ \boldsymbol{F}(\boldsymbol{x}) = (f_1(\boldsymbol{x}), \dots, f_m(\boldsymbol{x}) | f_s(\boldsymbol{x}) = \sum_{i,j} a_{i,j} x_i x_j + \sum_i b_i x_i , \qquad s \in [1, m] \right\}$$

The $\mathbf{MQ}$ Problem $\mathbf{MQ}(\boldsymbol{F}, \boldsymbol{v})$ is defined as given $\boldsymbol{v} \in \mathbb{F}_q^m$ find, if any, $\boldsymbol{s} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ such that $\boldsymbol{F}(\boldsymbol{s}) = \boldsymbol{v}$.

Decisional version is NP-complete [Garey, Johnson´79]

Multivariate Signatures (trad. approach)

$P: F^n \rightarrow F^m$, easily invertible non-linear

$S: F^n \rightarrow F^n$, $T: F^m \rightarrow F^m$, affine linear

Public key: $G = S \circ P \circ T$, hard to invert

Secret Key: S, P, T allows to find G^{-1}

$$G^{-1} = T^{-1} \circ P^{-1} \circ S^{-1}$$

Signing: $s = T^{-1} \circ P^{-1} \circ S^{-1}(m)$

Verifying: $G(s) =^? m$

Forging signature: Solve $G(s) - m = 0$

Fast

Large keys:
100 kBit for 100 bit security
Compared to 1776 bit RSA modulus

- UOV , Goubin et al., 1999
- Rainbow, Ding, et al. 2005
- pFlash, Cheng, 2007
- Gui, Ding, Petzoldt, 2015

Credits: Buchmann, Bindel 2015

Multivariate Cryptography

- Breaking scheme $\not\Leftrightarrow$ Solving MQ-Problem
  -> NP-complete is a worst-case notion
  (there might be – and there are for MQ -- easy instances)
  -> Not a random instance
  Many broken proposals
  -> Oil-and-Vinegar, SFLASH, MQQ-Sig, (Enhanced) TTS, Enhanced STS.
  -> Security somewhat unclear
- Only signatures
  -> (new proposal for encryption exists but too recent)
- Really large keys
- **New proposal with security reduction, small keys, but large signatures.**

Coding-based cryptography - BDD

Given:
- Linear code $C \subseteq F_2^n$
- $y \in F_2^n$
- $t \in \mathbb{N}$

Find:
- $x \in C$: $\mathrm{dist}(x, y) \leq t$



BDD is NP-complete (Berlekamp et al. 1978) (Decisional version)

Credits: Buchmann, Bindel 2015

McEliece PKE (1978)

S, G, P matrices over F

G generator matrix for Goppa code ← Allows to solve BDD

Public key: $G' = S \circ G \circ P$, t

Secret Key: P, S, G

Encryption: $c = mG' + z \in F^n$

Decryption: $x = cP^{-1} = mSG + zP^{-1}$

solve BDD to get $y = mSG$

decode to obtain m

Fast

Large public keys!
500 kBits for 100 bit security
Compared to 1776 bit RSA modulus

IND-CPA secure version

Credits: Buchmann, Bindel 2015

Code-based cryptography

- Breaking scheme $\not\Leftrightarrow$ Solving BDD
  -> NP-complete is a worst-case notion
  (there might be – and there are for BDD -- easy instances)
  -> Not a random instance
  However, McEliece with binary Goppa codes survived for almost 40 years (similar situation as for e.g. AES)
- Using more compact codes often leads to break
- So far, no practical signature scheme
- Really **large** public keys

Lattice-based cryptography

Basis: $B = (b_1, b_2) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2\times 2}; b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{Z}^2$

Lattice: $\Lambda(B) = \{x = By \mid y \in \mathbb{Z}^2\}$



Shortest vector problem (SVP)



(Worst-case) Lattice Problems

- **SVP:** Find shortest vector in lattice, given random basis. NP-hard (Ajtai'96)
- **Approximate SVP (αSVP):** Find short vector (norm < α times norm of shortest vector). Hardness depends on α (for α used in crypto not NP-hard).
- **CVP:** Given random point in underlying vectorspace (e.g. $\mathbb{Z}^n$), find the closest lattice point. (Generalization of SVP, reduction from SVP)
- **Approximate CVP (αCVP):** Find a „close“ lattice point. (Generalization of αSVP)

(Average-case) Lattice Problems Short Integer Solution (SIS)

$\mathbb{Z}_p^n = \text{n-dim.}$ vectors with entries mod p ($\approx n^3$)

Goal:

Given $\boldsymbol{A} = (\boldsymbol{a_1}, \boldsymbol{a_2}, \dots, \boldsymbol{a_m}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{n\times m}$

Find „small“ $\boldsymbol{s} = (s_1, \dots, s_m) \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ such that

$$\boldsymbol{As} = \boldsymbol{0} \bmod p$$

Reduction from worst-case αSVP.

Hash function

Set $m > n \log p$ and define $f_{\boldsymbol{A}}: \{0,1\}^m \to \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ as

$$f_{\boldsymbol{A}}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \boldsymbol{A}\boldsymbol{x} \bmod p$$

Collision-resistance: Given short $\boldsymbol{x_1}, \boldsymbol{x_2}$ with $\boldsymbol{A}\boldsymbol{x_1} = \boldsymbol{A}\boldsymbol{x_2}$ we can find a short solution as

$$\boldsymbol{A}\boldsymbol{x_1} = \boldsymbol{A}\boldsymbol{x_2} \Rightarrow \boldsymbol{A}\boldsymbol{x_1} - \boldsymbol{A}\boldsymbol{x_2} = \boldsymbol{0}$$
$$\boldsymbol{A}(\boldsymbol{x_1} - \boldsymbol{x_2}) = \boldsymbol{0}$$

So, $\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{x_1} - \boldsymbol{x_2}$ is a solution and it is short as $\boldsymbol{x_1}, \boldsymbol{x_2}$ are short.

Lattice-based crypto

- SIS: Allows to construct signature schemes, hash functions, ... , basically minicrypt.
- For more advanced applications: Learning with errors (LWE)
  - Allows to build PKE, IBE, FHE,...
- Performance: Sizes can almost reach those of RSA (just small const. factor), really fast (for lattices defined using polynomials).
- BUT: Exact security not well accessed, yet. Especially, no good estimate for quantum computer aided attacks.

Real-world PQC: New Hope

- Erdem Alkim, Léo Ducas, Thomas Pöppelmann, and Peter Schwabe: *Post-quantum key exchange – a new hope.* Usenix 2016

- Lattice-based key exchange

- Field test by Google:
  - New hope + X25519 used in Chrome Canary when certain Google services are accessed

Hash-based Signature Schemes

[Mer89]

- Post quantum
- Only secure hash function
- Security well understood
- Fast



FIG 1
AN AUTHENTICATION TREE WITH N = 8.
PAGE 41B

RSA – DSA – EC-DSA...



Merkle's Hash-based Signatures



Hash-based signatures

- Only signatures
- Minimal security assumptions
- Well understood
- Fast & compact (2kB, few ms), but stateful, or
- Stateless, bigger and slower (41kB, several ms).

- Two Internet drafts (drafts for RFCs), one in „waiting for ISRG review“

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PQCrypto

Initial recommendations

- **Symmetric encryption** Thoroughly analyzed, 256-bit keys:
  - AES-256
  - Salsa20 with a 256-bit key

  Evaluating: Serpent-256, ...
- **Symmetric authentication** Informati[illegible]etic MACs:
  - GCM using a 96-bit nonce an[illegible]bit authenticator
  - Poly1305
- **Public-key encrypti[illegible]** [illegible]liece with binary Goppa codes:
  - length $n =$ [illegible]nension $k = 5413$, $t = 119$ errors

  Evaluatin[illegible]DPC, Stehlé-Steinfeld NTRU, ...
- **Pu[illegible] signatures** Hash-based (minimal assumptions):
  - XMSS with any of the parameters specified in CFRG draft
  - SPHINCS-256

  Evaluating: HFEv-, ...

Confidence inspiring solutions are slow, too big, ...

Time to deployment



- Theoretical design

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„Official“ developments

- Feb `13: First PQC draft in **IRTF´s CFRG**
- Sep `13: **ETSI** holds first PQC WS (afterwards annually)
- April `15: **NIST** holds conference on PQC
- Aug `15: **NSA** announces transition to PQC
- Feb `16: **NIST** announces `PQC competition‘
- Dec `16: **NIST** opens call for proposals

Scheduled:

- 2024: „Draft standards ready“ (**NIST**, Feb `16)

PQCrypto 2017, June 26-28

- Conference location Utrecht, now looking for bigger venue ;-)
- **Dates:**
  - School: June 19-23,
  - Executive school: June 22-23,
  - Conference: June 26-28.
- AMS airport Schiphol is 30 min by train (4 $\times$ per hour)
- Other airports: Rotterdam, Eindhoven, Düsseldorf.
- Direct ICEs from FRA.
- School location will be Eindhoven. Travel time Eindhoven–Utrecht: 50 min.

Thank you!
Questions?