

# Post-quantum security of the sponge construction

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Based on joined work with Jan Czajkowski, Christian Schaffner, Leon Groot Bruinderink, Dominique Unruh


# Post-quantum security of hash functions

- Hashes ubiquitous in public key crypto
- Public function -> Adversary can run on quantum computer
- Believe: Grover is best adversary can do
  - True if hash behaves like random function (Zhandry'15, Hülsing, Rijneveld, Song '16)
- What if hash has structure?
- What if classical properties do not suffice?

What if hash has  
structure?


# Hash function design

- Create fixed input size building block
- Use building block to build compression function
- Use „mode“ for length extension




# SHA2: Most classical results carry over

(CR / OW) compression function  $\Rightarrow$  (CR / OW) Hash



# SHA3: Classical result fails in quantum setting



Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Michaël Peeters and Gilles Van Assche. Cryptographic Sponge Functions. 2007


# SHA3: Classical result fails in quantum setting

**Theorem** ([BDPV07] Informally):

If  $f$  is a random permutation or transformation, the expected complexity for differentiating a sponge  $S_f$  from a random oracle is  $\mathcal{O}(2^{c/2})$ .

- Proof inherently query based.
- Proof requires knowledge of queries to  $S_f$ .

# SHA3: Classical result fails in quantum setting





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# SHA3: Classical result fails in quantum setting


**Note:** If  $f$  is random permutation,  $f$  is not one-way,  $f(s \oplus (x||0^c))$  is not collision resistant, and  $f^{\text{left}}$  and  $f^{\text{right}}$  are neither one-way nor collision-resistant. (If adversary gets access to  $f^{-1}$ )




What if classical  
properties do not  
suffice?

# Collapsing (Unruh, 2016)

- Quantum version of collision resistance
- Example: collapse-binding commitments



(a) – Game<sub>1</sub>



(b) – Game<sub>2</sub>


$\forall(A, B)$  – quantum PPT adversary :

$$|\Pr[b = 1 : \text{Game1}] - \Pr[b = 1 : \text{Game2}]| \approx 0$$

# Results (<http://ia.cr/2017/771>)


- Proofs for sponges if block function  $f$  is **random function or random one-way permutation** (does not cover SHA3!).
- **Collision-resistance** from collision-resistance and zero-preimage resistance of  $f^{\text{left}}$  and  $f^{\text{right}}$
- **Collapsing** from collapsing and zero-preimage resistance of  $f^{\text{left}}$  and  $f^{\text{right}}$ .
- Quantum attack that meets lower bounds.

# Collapsing Proof (Intuition)




- Hybrid argument
- Omitted here: Have to deal with preimages of  $0^c$


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


# Collapsing Proof (Intuition)





# Collapsing Proof (Intuition)



**Careful:** This gives the misleading impression that all messages in superposition are of equal length!

Thank you!  
Questions?

