MQDSS

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In a nutshell..

- $\mathcal{MQ}$-based 5-pass identification scheme
  - Fiat-Shamir transform
- Loose reduction from (only!) $\mathcal{MQ}$ problem
  - Security proof, instead of typical 'break and tweak' in $\mathcal{MQ}$ cryptography
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- **Changes in Second Round submission**
  - Reduction of number of rounds
  - Added randomness in commitments
  - More precise analysis of best attacks against $\mathcal{MQ}$

Fiat-Shamir transform

IDS



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

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

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

Sakumoto-Shirai-Hiwatari 5-pass IDS [SSH11]

$\mathcal{P} : (\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s})$		$\mathcal{V} : (\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{v})$
$\mathbf{r}_0, \mathbf{t}_0 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_q^n, \mathbf{e}_0 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_q^m$		
$\mathbf{r}_1 \leftarrow \mathbf{s} - \mathbf{r}_0$		
$c_0 \leftarrow \mathit{Com}(\mathbf{r}_0, \mathbf{t}_0, \mathbf{e}_0)$		
$c_1 \leftarrow \mathit{Com}(\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{t}_0, \mathbf{r}_1) + \mathbf{e}_0)$	$\xrightarrow{(c_0, c_1)}$	
	$\xleftarrow{\alpha}$	$\alpha \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_q$
$\mathbf{t}_1 \leftarrow \alpha\mathbf{r}_0 - \mathbf{t}_0$		
$\mathbf{e}_1 \leftarrow \alpha\mathbf{F}(\mathbf{r}_0) - \mathbf{e}_0$	$\xrightarrow{\mathsf{resp}_1 = (\mathbf{t}_1, \mathbf{e}_1)}$	
	$\xleftarrow{\mathsf{ch}_2}$	$\mathsf{ch}_2 \leftarrow_R \{0, 1\}$
If $\mathsf{ch}_2 = 0$, $\mathsf{resp}_2 \leftarrow \mathbf{r}_0$		
Else $\mathsf{resp}_2 \leftarrow \mathbf{r}_1$	$\xrightarrow{\mathsf{resp}_2}$	
		If $\mathsf{ch}_2 = 0$, Parse $\mathsf{resp}_2 = \mathbf{r}_0$, check
		$c_0 \stackrel{?}{=} \mathit{Com}(\mathbf{r}_0, \alpha\mathbf{r}_0 - \mathbf{t}_1, \alpha\mathbf{F}(\mathbf{r}_0) - \mathbf{e}_1)$
		Else Parse $\mathsf{resp}_2 = \mathbf{r}_1$, check
		$c_1 \stackrel{?}{=} \mathit{Com}(\mathbf{r}_1, \alpha(\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{r}_1)) - \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{t}_1, \mathbf{r}_1) - \mathbf{e}_1)$

MQDSS

- Generate keys
  - Sample seed $\mathcal{S}_F \in \{0,1\}^k$, $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ $\Rightarrow \mathbf{sk} = (\mathcal{S}_F, \mathbf{s})$
  - Expand $\mathcal{S}_F$ to $\mathbf{F}$, compute $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{s})$ $\Rightarrow \mathbf{pk} = (\mathcal{S}_F, \mathbf{v})$

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  - Reconstruct challenges
  - Reconstruct commitments
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- Parameters: n, m, q, r (and Com, Hash & PRG)

Round 2 update: Parameter Sets

	Sec. cat.	q	n $(= m)$	r	pk (bytes)	sk (bytes)	Signature (bytes)
MQDSS-31-48	1-2	31	48	135	46	16	20854
(Round 1)				269	62	32	32882
MQDSS-31-64	3-4	31	64	202	64	24	43728
(Round 1)				403	88	48	67800

Table: Round 1 parameters in black, Round 2 parameters in red.

- q, $n = m$ chosen using best attacks on $\mathcal{MQ}$
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- q, $n = m$ chosen using best attacks on $\mathcal{MQ}$
  - q additionally chosen for fast arithmetic
- r chosen such that $2^{-(r \log \frac{2q}{q+1})} < 2^{-k}$
  - **mistake in calculation in Round 1, chose k too large**

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- **Round 2:**
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  - Proof updated accordingly
  - Still needs randomness ($2\times$ commitment length [Lei18])
  - $\Rightarrow$ adds approx 4KB (10KB) to signature for MQDSS-31-48 (MQDSS-31-64)

Round 2 performance

- Reference implementation

	keygen	signing	verification
MQDSS-31-48	1 192 984	26 630 590	19 840 136
Round 1	1 206 730	52 466 398	38 686 506
MQDSS-31-64	2 767 384	85 268 712	62 306 098
Round 1	2 806 750	169 298 364	123 239 874

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- AVX2 implementation (only round 2)

	keygen	signing	verification
MQDSS-31-48	1 074 644	3 816 106	2 551 270
MQDSS-31-64	2 491 050	9 047 148	6 132 948

Round 2 update: More precise analysis of hardness of $\mathcal{MQ}$

- Best strategy: Algebraic techniques with exhaustive search
  - HybridF5 [BFS15], BooleanSolve [BFSS13], Crossbred [JV17]

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Round 2 update: More precise analysis of hardness of $\mathcal{MQ}$

- Best strategy: Algebraic techniques with exhaustive search
  - HybridF5 [BFS15], BooleanSolve [BFSS13], Crossbred [JV17]
- Analyze both classically and using Grover
  - Classical gates, quantum gates, circuit depth
  - minor changes in **Round 2** - more precise analysis
  - no influence to security of parameter sets

Recent attack

- August 2019, Daniel Kales and Greg Zaverucha - forgery in approx. 2^{95} hash calls for MQDSS-31-48

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- **Proof still valid!**
  - Attack is result of not taking into account non-tightness of proof for choosing parameters
- **New parameters after attack (estimate):**

	Sec. cat.	q	n	r	pk	sk	Signature
MQDSS-31-48 (new)	1-2	31	48	184	46B	16B	28400B
Round 1				269	62B	32B	32882B
MQDSS-31-64 (new)	3-4	31	64	277	64B	24B	59928B
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Thank you for your attention!

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